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to be in a trade or business.13 In that setting, with no trade or 
business, a pro rata distribution would most likely be a dividend 
and a disproportionate distribution in exchange for some 
shareholders’ stock in the distributing corporation would likely 
be a stock redemption. 
In general, a corporation is treated as engaged in a trade or 
business if a specific group of activities is being carried on by 
the corporation for the purpose of earning income or profit.14 
What is a business in context of leasing out assets? For farm 
or ranch corporations, a major question is whether land ownership 
alone is a trade or business. The regulations state that the leasing 
of land would be a business if the corporation performs “active 
and substantial management and operational functions.”15  In  
Rev. Rul. 73-234,16 a livestock share lease with active involvement 
by the corporate representatives satisfied the active business 
requirement. The ruling states that the requirement that a trade 
or business be actively conducted connotes substantial 
management and operational activities directly carried on by the 
corporation itself, and not the activities of others outside the 
corporation, including independent contractors.17 The 1973 
ruling goes on to state that “. . . the fact that a portion of a 
corporation’s business activities is performed by independent 
contractors will not preclude the corporation from being engaged 
in the active conduct of a trade or business if the corporation 
itself directly performs active and substantial management and 
operational functions.”18 In Rev. Rul. 73-236,19 a trust conducting 
its real estate leasing business activities through independent 
contractors did not satisfy the requirement of active conduct of 
a trade or business. 
Thus, the activities of an independent contractor or agent are 
not imputed to the principal (the property owner) even though, 
in general, activities of an agent are imputed to the principal 
except where a statute or regulation blocks imputation20 as in 
the case where the activity is routed through Section 1402 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which blocks imputation21 or the activity 
comes under the passive activity rules of I.R.C. § 469.22 Thus, it 
would appear that IRS, by ruling, is attempting to block 
imputation. 
In Rev. Rul. 86-126,23 the active business requirement was not 
met where a corporation cash rented farmland, with a sharing of 
expenses, to a tenant who planted, raised, harvested and sold 
crops using the tenant’s equipment. The activities of the 
corporate officers in leasing land, providing advice and 
reviewing accounts were not substantial enough to meet the 
active business requirement.24 
In a 1992 ruling,25 a corporation that was a general partner in 
a limited partnership was considered to be engaged in the active 
conduct of a trade or business if the corporate officers performed 
active and substantial management functions for the partnership. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 I.R.C. § 355(b). See generally 8 Harl, Agricultural Law § 
59.07 (2004); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 7.02[6][c] 
(2004). 
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1). 
3 See Pub. L. No. 99-514, Sec. 631, 100 Stat. 2269 (1986). 
4 I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(A). 
5 I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(A), (B). 
6 I.R.C. § 355(a)(1). 
7 I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D). 
8 I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B). 
9 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D). 
10 I.R.C. § 355(b)(1)(A), (B). See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(a)(1). 
11
 I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(B). 
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(a)(ii). 
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iv)(A). 
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(ii). 
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iii). 
16 1973-2 C.B. 180. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 1973-1 C.B. 183. 
20 See Harl, Agricultural Law § 41.06 (2004). 
21 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1). A 1974 amendment provides that 
material participation is to be achieved by the owner for S.E. 
tax purposes “without regard to any activities of an agent of 
such owner . . . in the production or the management of 
production of such agricultural or horticultural activities.” Id. 
22 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(b)(2)(ii). 
23 1986-2 C.B. 58. 
24 Id. 
25 
 Rev. Rul. 92-17, 1992-1 C.B. 142. 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRUPTCY 
FEDERAL TAX 
DISCHARGE. The debtor filed the 1999 tax return on April 
15, 2000. The debtor filed for Chapter 11 on April 3, 2003. 
The court held that the 1999 taxes were nondischargeable under 
Section 523(a)(1)(A) because the return was due less than three 
years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In re Walker, 
2004-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,287 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004). 
The debtors, husband and wife, filed for Chapter 7 and 
received a discharge in a no-asset case. The back page of the 
Bankruptcy Form 18 describing the discharge stated that “debts 
for most taxes” were not discharged. After the case was closed, 
the IRS sought collection of unpaid taxes. Two years later, the 
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debtors sought to reopen their Chapter 7 case to adjudicate 
the dischargeability of the taxes. The main issue involved 
whether the taxpayers had filed a sufficient tax return for the 
years involved to allow for discharge of the taxes. The 
Bankruptcy Court declined to reopen the case because of the 
long time since the closing of the case and because the debtors 
could bring the action in the Tax Court which was able to 
adjudicate the issues involved. In re Otto, 2004-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,296 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2004). 
FEDERALAGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
ADMINISTRATION. The USDA has adopted as final 
regulations which remove barriers to faith-based organizations’ 
participation in USDA programs. The regulations are part of 
USDA’s effort to fulfill its responsibilities under two Executive 
Orders issued by President Bush. One of these Orders, 
Executive Order 13280, which was published in the Federal 
Register on December 16, 2002 (67 Fed. Reg. 77145), created 
a Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives in USDA 
and charged USDA to identify and eliminate regulatory, 
contracting, and other programmatic barriers to the full 
participation of faith-based and community organizations in 
its programs. The second of these Orders, Executive Order 
13279, also published in the Federal Register on December 
16, 2002 (67 Fed. Reg. 77141), charged executive branch 
agencies to give equal treatment to faith-based and community 
groups that apply for funds to meet social needs in America’s 
communities. 69 Fed. Reg. 41375 (July 9, 2004). 
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final 
regulations changing Wyoming from a Class Free to Class A 
state under the brucellosis regulations. 69 Fed. Reg. 40763 
(July 7, 2004). 
The APHIS has adopted as final regulations amending the 
brucellosis indemnity regulations to allow indemnity payments 
for sheep, goats, and horses destroyed because of brucellosis. 
69 Fed. Reg. 41909 (July 13, 2004). 
“MAD COW” DISEASE. The APHIS, FDA and FSIS have 
announced a series of regulatory actions and policy changes 
to strengthen protections against the spread of bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy BSE (“Mad Cow” disease) in 
U.S. cattle and against human exposure to the BSE agent. The 
Secretary of Agriculture also convened an international panel 
of experts on BSE to review the U.S. response to the 
Washington state case and make recommendations that could 
provide meaningful additional public or animal health benefits. 
The announcement also served to provide advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking, to inform the public about the panel’s 
recommendations, and to solicit comment on additional 
measures under consideration based on those 
recommendations and other considerations. 69 Fed. Reg. 
42287 (July 14, 2004). 
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
ACT. The plaintiffs were produce sellers who had sold produce 
to a produce handler but were not fully paid for the produce. 
The handler had a checking account with the defendant bank 
which had provided the handler with a one day overdraft 
protection for checks issued for produce. The overdraft 
protection failed to provide sufficient relief and the handler 
eventually closed when the plaintiffs were still unpaid. The 
handler attempted to negotiate a debt repayment plan with the 
defendants in order to continue the produce business and the 
plaintiffs orally agreed to withhold their PACA trust claims in 
exchange for monthly installment payments on the existing 
debts. Although some payments were made, the plaintiffs 
decided to sue for their rights under the PACA trust and sought 
recovery from the defendant bank, alleging that the bank 
improperly used PACA trust funds to pay the overdrafts and 
to pay non-PACA creditors and that the bank was also liable 
for the payments made by the handler to non-PACA creditors. 
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the handler 
had violated the PACA trust by paying non-PACA trust 
creditors, but refused to extend the liability to the bank based 
on the overdraft payment protection procedure used by the 
bank. The court noted that the overdraft protection was part of 
ordinary business practice and did not affect the handler’s 
payment of non-PACAcreditors. In addition, the appellate court 
held that the plaintiffs’ oral agreement to accept monthly 
installment payments removed the payments from PACA trust 
protection because payments could be made more than 30 days 
after delivery of the produce. The court acknowledged that 
the PACA regulations require a payment extension to be in 
writing and be entered into before the sale in order for PACA 
trust protection to be lost; however, the court supported its 
holding by ruling that the post-agreement writings between 
the parties were sufficient, under the Statute of Frauds, to prove 
the oral agreement and give it the effect of a writing. The 
appellate court also ruled, in effect, that the requirement that 
the writing exist before the sale was not sufficient to excuse 
the agreement to extend the payment period. On both of these 
issues, the court reasoned that the explicit language of the 
statute and regulations did not apply because the purposes of 
the statute and regulations were not served by applying them 
strictly against the bank. Thus, the court held that the bank 
was not liable for the PACA trust funds paid on the overdrafts 
to non-PACA creditors, either by the bank or the produce 
handler. American Banana Co., Inc. v. Republic National 
Bank of New York, N.A., 362 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’g, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25101 (S.D. N.Y. 2002). 
The debtor had purchased agricultural produce from a seller 
and had not paid for the produce. The seller obtained a court 
ruling that the debtor owed over $37,000 for the produce and 
that the debt was subject to the PACA trust. The debtor did not 
actively participate in that court case and the ruling was entered 
by default. The debtor then filed for Chapter 13 and the seller 
sought to have the debt declared nondischargeable for breach 
of fiduciary duty by the debtor under PACA. The seller argued 
that the trial court’s ruling that the debt was subject to the 
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PACA trust estopped the debtor from claiming that the debt was 
not subject to PACA. The court refused to grant summary 
judgment on this issue because the seller did not provide 
sufficient evidence that the debtor had actively participated in 
the default judgment rendered by the trial court. The debtor 
argued that it was not subject to PACA because it did not ever 
receive more than one ton of produce in any single day nor did 
it have more than $230,000 in purchases in a year. The debtor 
submitted only a personal affidavit to support the argument. 
However, the court held that, absent evidence from the seller 
that proved that the debtor was subject to PACA, a grant of 
summary judgment was improper. In re Masdea, 307 B.R. 466 
(Bankr. W.D. Penn. 2004). 
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has issued proposed 
regulations which remove two inconsistent definitions of 
affected herd under the tuberculosis regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 77.5, 
77.20, and add a new definition of affected herd as “a herd of 
livestock in which there is strong and substantial evidence that 
Mycobacterium bovis exists. This evidence should include, but 
is not limited to, any of the following: epidemiologic evidence, 
histopathology, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay, bacterial 
isolation or detection, testing data, or association with known 
sources of infection.” 69 Fed. Reg. 40329 (July 2, 2004), 
amending 7 C.F.R. § 77.2. 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
DISCLAIMER. The decedent’s will established a trust for 
the surviving spouse to be funded with an amount of estate 
property equal to the “aggregate federal estate tax exemption 
equivalent.” The will provided that the trust could not be 
decreased by a disclaimer of the surviving spouse; however, the 
will also provided that any disclaimer by the spouse of property 
passing under the residuary bequest would be added to the trust. 
The spouse disclaimed a substantial amount of stock passing 
under the residuary bequest, resulting in a funding of the trust 
with property in excess of the “aggregate federal estate tax 
exemption equivalent” and causing the estate to be subject to 
estate tax. The estate argued that the decedent had intended that 
the trust be funded only with property up to the “aggregate 
federal estate tax exemption equivalent;” therefore, the 
disclaimed property was the only property included in the trust. 
The court agreed that the decedent’s intent was clear, but held 
that the surviving spouse’s independent action of disclaiming 
the residuary property caused the overfunding of the trust and 
imposition of estate tax. Estate of Katz v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2004-166. 
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS. I.R.C. § 2632 
provides deemed allocation rules pursuant to which an 
individual’s available GST exemption is automatically allocated 
to certain kinds of transfers, without any action on the part of 
the transferor. Under I.R.C. § 2632(c)(5)(A)(i)(I), an individual 
may elect out of the deemed allocation rules so that the GST 
exemption will not be allocated automatically to a particular 
transfer that is an indirect skip. Under I.R.C. § 
2632(c)(5)(B)(i), this election out with regard to a particular 
indirect skip shall be deemed timely if made on a timely filed 
gift tax return for the calendar year in which the transfer was 
made, or deemed to have been made under I.R.C. § 2632(c)(4) 
with regard to trusts subject to an estate tax inclusion period, 
or on such later dates as may be prescribed in regulations. 
The IRS has issued proposed regulations which provide 
guidance for making the election under I.R.C. § 
2632(c)(5)(A)(i) to not have the deemed (automatic) allocation 
of unused GST tax exemption under I.R.C. § 2632(c)(1) apply 
with regard to certain transfers to a GST trust, as defined in 
I.R.C. § 2632(c)(3)(B). Under the proposed regulations, the 
election out of the automatic allocation rules for indirect skips 
and the election to treat any trust as a GST trust are to be 
made on a timely filed federal gift tax return. Under the 
proposed regulations, a transferor who wants to elect out of 
the automatic allocation rules for indirect skips has the option 
of electing out for the specific transfer to the GST trust, or 
making a single election with regard to the trust that applies 
to the current transfer and all subsequent transfers made by 
that transferor to the trust. Under the second option, once the 
election is made with regard to a trust, the election remains 
effective for all subsequent transfers to that trust by the 
electing transferor, until that transferor’s election is 
terminated. If under the terms of the trust instrument 
distributions to skip persons are unlikely, the transferor may 
choose not to allocate the GST exemption to the trust. The 
rule in the proposed regulation is intended to alleviate the 
need to repeatedly file a gift tax return to elect out of the 
automatic allocation rules for transfers that would not 
otherwise require a federal gift tax return to be filed. Thus, 
once the transferor “elects out” of the automatic allocation 
rule for indirect skips with regard to any or all transfers made 
by that transferor to the trust, the election out, until terminated, 
remains effective for all subsequent transfers made by that 
transferor to the trust, without any further reporting 
requirement on the part of the transferor. The proposed 
regulations also provide guidance for making the election 
under I.R.C. § 2632(c)(5)(A)(ii) to treat a trust as a GST trust. 
69 Fed. Reg. 42000 (July 13, 2004). 
GIFTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, had received a 
large amount of stock from the sale of two corporations in 
which the husband was employed. The taxpayers wanted to 
transfer much of the stock to their children and formed a family 
limited partnership, ostensibly with trusts for the children as 
limited partners; however, the taxpayers failed to completely 
establish the written materials for the trusts. Once the 
partnership was formed, the taxpayers transferred stock to 
the partnership and filed gift tax returns which treated the 
transfer as a transfer of partnership interests to the childrens’ 
trusts. The transferred partnership interests were valued using 
discounts for lack of marketability and for minority interests. 
The court held that the transfers were deemed to be transfers 
of the underlying stock and not entitled to any discounts for 
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valuation of the transfers. The court noted that, although the 
partnership was legitimate and the trusts effective, the 
taxpayers failure to follow all the legal requirements and 
procedures for trusts and partnerships indicated that the real 
purpose of the transfers was the transfer of the stock and not 
the establishment of a partnership for non-estate and gift 
planning purposes. Senda v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-160. 
SPECIAL USE VALUATION. The IRS has issued the 
2004 list of average annual effective interest rates charged on 
new loans by the Farm Credit Bank system to be used in 
computing the value of real property for special use valuation 
purposes for deaths in 2004: 





U.S. AgBank 6.84 
District States 
AgFirst	 Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, 
Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina,Virginia, West Virginia 
CoBank	 Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington 
AgriBank	 Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Wyoming 
Texas	 Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas 
U.S. AgBank	 Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, 
Nevada, New Mexico, South Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Utah 
Rev. Rul. 2004-63, I.R.B. 2004-27, 6. 
TRUSTS. The taxpayer established an irrevocable trust for 
the taxpayer’s descendants. Although the taxpayer did not 
retain any beneficial interest in the trust income or principal, 
the taxpayer retained sufficient control over the trust for the 
trust income to be included in the taxpayer’s gross income. 
The IRS ruled on three scenarios for this trust on the death of 
the taxpayer: (1) the trust did not provide for any distribution 
to the taxpayer to compensate the taxpayer for the income tax 
liability caused by including trust income in the taxpayer’s 
gross income; (2) the trust provided for distribution of trust 
principal to the taxpayer to compensate the taxpayer for the 
income tax liability caused by including trust income in the 
taxpayer’s gross income; and (3) the trust granted the trustee 
the discretion to make distribution of trust principal to the 
taxpayer to compensate the taxpayer for the income tax liability 
caused by including trust income in the taxpayer’s gross 
income. In the first situation, the IRS ruled that the taxpayer 
does not make a gift to the descendants of the taxes owed nor 
are the taxes included in the taxpayer’s gross estate. In the 
second situation, there is no gift from the taxpayer or from 
the descendants because the trust is required to make the 
distribution. However, the trust property is included in the 
taxpayer’s gross estate because the taxpayer retained a right 
to receive trust property. In the third situation, there is no gift 
from the taxpayer or from the descendants and the trust would 
be included in the taxpayer’s estate only if there is an agreement 
between the trustee and taxpayer to make the distributions. Rev. 
Rul. 2004-64, I.R.B. 2004-27, 7. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayers, husband and 
wife, formed a family trust which reached an agreement with a 
charitable organization for the organization to acquire a life 
insurance policy on the life of the wife. The trust made payments 
to the charity without restrictions but the charity used the 
contribution to pay the premium on the insurance policy. The 
trust made another payment the following year and the charity 
again made the premium payment. The trust and charity agreed 
to split the proceeds of the insurance upon the death of the wife. 
The agreement and insurance policy were terminated the third 
year. The court held that the taxpayers were not entitled to a 
charitable deduction for the contributions to the charity because 
the taxpayers received something of value in exchange. When 
the payments were made, the charity supplied the taxpayers with 
a receipt stating that no consideration was paid for the 
contributions, which was false. The court held that the false 
receipt resulted in the taxpayers failing to have sufficient 
substantiation of the contributions to support a deduction. Addis 
v. Comm’r, 2004-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,291 (9th Cir. 
2004), aff’g, 118 T.C. 528 (2002). 
The taxpayers, husband and wife, formed a trust and transferred 
all assets and income to the trust. The trust filed Form 1041 
income tax returns and claimed income from the wages and 
commissions earned by the taxpayers and deductions for the 
personal expenses of the taxpayers. The trust also claimed 
deductions for several charitable gifts above $250 but the 
taxpayers did not have any written acknowledgment of the gifts. 
The court held that the charitable deduction for the 
unsubstantiated gifts was properly denied by the IRS. Hill v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-156. 
CORPORATIONS. 
DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer owned stock in a corporation 
which owned stock of another corporation. The owner corporation 
distributed its stock to the shareholders, including the taxpayer, 
in the other corporation as part of a spin-off of the other 
corporation. The taxpayer argued that the stock was not dividend 
income because (1) the corporation did not have sufficient 
earnings to support a dividend and (2) inasmuch as the taxpayer 
was required to accept the stock, the stock had a lower value. 
The court found that the taxpayer did not present any evidence 
to support these arguments and ruled that the stock distribution 
was a dividend included in gross income. Koppel v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2004-158. 
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A corporation had issued debt instruments to an unrelated 
party. The corporation also owned all the stock of a subsidiary 
corporation. The subsidiary corporation purchased the debt 
instruments and distributed them to the parent corporation. The 
IRS ruled that the distribution of the debt to the parent 
corporation constituted a dividend of the fair market value of 
the debt if the subsidiary’s profits and earnings are equal to or 
exceed the fair market value of the debt. If the adjusted issue 
price of the debt exceeds the amount of the distribution, the 
parent corporation will receive discharge of indebtedness 
income. Rev. Rul. 2004-79, I.R.B. 2004-31. 
REORGANIZATION. A corporation had issued debt 
instruments in 2004 with a fair market interest rate and maturity 
date of 2006. In 2004, the corporation is acquired in a Type A, 
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A), reorganization and the debt securities 
of the corporation are exchanged for debt securities in the 
merged corporation, with the interest rate changed to reflect 
the change in creditworthiness of the resulting corporation. 
The IRS noted that, for purposes of I.R.C. § 354, the term 
securities is not defined and case law has held that debt 
instruments of less than five years are not considered securities. 
However, the IRS held that the exchange of debt instruments 
in the merger were sufficiently similar to allow the merger to 
qualify for I.R.C. § 354 nonrecognition of gain or loss from 
the exchange of debt instruments, even though the interest rate 
changed and the remainder of the debt term was less than five 
years at the time of the exchange. Rev. Rul. 2004-78, I.R.B. 
2004-31. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On June 30, 2004, the President 
determined that certain areas in Michigan were eligible for 
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (42 USC 5121) as a result of severe storms, tornadoes and 
flooding, which began on May 20, 2004. FEMA-1527-DR. 
On June 30, 2004, the President determined that certain areas 
in Arkansas were eligible for assistance under the Act as a 
result of severe storms and flooding, which began on May 30, 
2004. FEMA-1528-DR. On June 30, 2004, the President 
determined that certain areas in California were eligible for 
assistance under the Act as a result of a levee break on June 3, 
2004. FEMA-1529-DR. Accordingly, taxpayers in the affected 
areas who sustained losses may deduct them on their 2003 
federal income tax returns. 
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was an attorney and also 
operated a rodeo and horse training activity. Although the 
taxpayer had a long history with horses and actively pursued 
the rodeo and horse-showing activities, the court held that the 
activity was not engaged in to make a profit because (1) the 
taxpayer did not keep any separate records of the activity, (2) 
the taxpayer had substantial income from the law practice 
which was offset by the losses from the horse activity, (3) 
although the ranch property and horses were expected to 
appreciate, the taxpayer provided no evidence of the 
appreciation or that the appreciation was expected to exceed 
the losses, and (4) the taxpayer received substantial personal 
enjoyment from the activities. Matthews v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summary Op. 2004-89. 
INFORMATION REPORTING. The IRS has adopted as 
final regulations relating to the information reporting 
requirements, information reporting penalties, backup 
withholding requirements for payment card transactions, and 
the IRS TIN Matching Program. 69 Fed. Reg. 41938 (July 
13, 2004). 
PARTNERSHIPS 
TERMINATION. The taxpayer was a general partner in a 
two person partnership which operated a marina. The partners 
disagreed on the management of the marina and the general 
partner decided to terminate the partnership. The partnership 
agreement required the partnership to sell the partnership 
property in a public sale and to distribute the proceeds; 
however, the general partner did not sell the marina and only 
issued a check to the other partner for that partner’s share. The 
general partner filed a final partnership income tax return. The 
other partner filed a suit in state court to enforce the partnership 
agreement but was eventually required to accept a cash 
payment. The court held that the partnership did not terminate 
on the filing of the final partnership return because the 
partnership agreement required the sale of the partnership 
property and additional income could have been recognized 
in the year after the final tax return was filed. Harbor Cove 
Marina Partners Partnership v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. No. 4 
(2004). 
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The taxpayers had passive 
activity losses of $22,000 from residential real estate. The 
taxpayer had wage income of $118,000 and state lottery 
winnings of $136,000. Although the passive activity losses are 
normally allowed up to $25,000 for rental activity, the allowed 
amount is decreased where adjusted gross income exceeds 
$100,000. The taxpayers argued that the lottery winnings 
should not be included in determining the amount of passive 
activity losses allowed, but the court held that, because lottery 
winnings are included in adjusted gross income, they are also 
included in determining the allowed amount of the passive 
activity losses. Hamilton v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-161. 
PENSION PLANS. The taxpayer owned a Section 401(k) 
retirement plan and withdrew $100,000 from the plan to pay 
the higher education expenses of the taxpayer’s children. The 
taxpayer included the withdrawal amount in income but did 
not pay the 10 percent early withdrawal penalty. The taxpayer 
argued that the penalty did not apply because the withdrawal 
was used for education expenses. The court held that the 
education expenses exception of I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E) did not 
apply to Section 401(k) plans but only applied to IRAs; 
therefore, the withdrawal was subject to the 10 percent penalty 
for early withdrawals. Esposito v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary 
Op. 2004-88. 
For plans beginning in July 2004 for purposes of determining 
the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7), the 
corporate bond weighted average is 6.32 percent with the 
permissible range of 5.69 to 6.32 percent (90 to 120 percent 
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permissible range). The 30-year Treasury securities rate for this 
period is 5.17 percent, the 90 percent to 105 percent permissible 
range is 4.65 percent to 5.43 percent, and the 90 percent to 110 
percent permissible range is 4.65 percent to 5.69 percent. 
Notice 2004-51, I.R.B. 2004-29. 
The taxpayer received a complete distribution of an employee 
retirement plan but did not receive any notice of the 60 day 
period for rolling over the funds to another qualified account. 
The taxpayer learned about the 60-day rule from an investment 
advisor and sought an extension of the period in order to roll 
over the funds to a qualified account. The IRS granted the 
extension of the rollover period. Ltr. Rul. 200427027, April 
6, 2004. 
PERFORMING ARTIST DEDUCTIONS. The taxpayer 
was employed as an attorney and earned $16,000 in the tax 
year. The taxpayer also worked as a performing artist and earned 
$13,435 in the tax year and claimed deductions for expenses 
of $17,878. Under I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1), (2)(B), performing artists 
are allowed deductions for expenses only if the artist earns 
less than $16,000 in the tax year. The taxpayer argued that the 
income limitation applied only to the income from performing 
and did not include income from other sources. The court held 
that the taxpayer was not entitled to the performing expenses 
deductions because the taxpayer’s income from all sources 
exceeded $16,000 in the tax year. Fleischli v. Comm’r, 123 
T.C. No. 3 (2004). 
RENT INCOME. The IRS has adopted as final regulations 
which authorize the IRS to provide administrative guidance 
for allowing advance rent payments for intelectual property 
and computer software to be included in tax years other than 
the tax year in which the payments were received. 69 Fed. 
Reg. 41192 (July 8, 2004). 
RETURNS. The IRS has announced the release of two new 
publications on car donations, IRS Publication 4302, A 
Charity’s Guide to Car Donations, and IRS Publication 4303, 
A Donor’s Guide to Car Donations, to assist individual 




FEDERAL FARM PROGRAM PAYMENTS. In May 
2002, the debtor borrowed money from the creditor and granted 
the creditor a security interest in “government payments,” farm 
equipment and the debtor’s “present and future rights, title and 
interest in and to all crops growing or to be planted, cultivated, 
grown, raised and/or harvested on the land more fully described 
herein or on any exhibit attached hereto and expressly made a 
part hereof. . ..” The security agreement describes the debtor’s 
farmland. The creditor filed financing statements on May 15, 
2002 for the government payments, farm products and farm 
equipment with the county recorders for the counties in which 
the debtor’s farm land was located and did not file any 
financing statements with the state central filing system. The 
2002 Farm Bill was enacted on May 13, 2002. The debtor 
filed for Chapter 11 in February 2003, before the normal 
planting season. The issue was whether the creditor had a 
security interest in the debtor’s 2003 crops and government 
payments (specifically, direct and counter-cyclical program 
payments (DCP)) or whether the crops and government 
payments were post-bankruptcy estate property. The court 
found that the regulations governing the DCP payments were 
dependent upon the debtor’s prior crop history and not on the 
current crop planting; therefore, the debtor became entitled 
to the DCP payments prior to filing for bankruptcy and the 
security interest attached prior to the bankruptcy filing. 
However, the court held that the financing statements for the 
government payments were required by Ark. Code. 4-9­
501(a)(3) to be filed with the Arkansas Secretary of State. 
Because the financing statements were all filed locally, the 
security interest in the government payments was unperfected 
and the debtor could avoid the security interest in the 2003 
DCP payments. In Re Stevens, 307 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ark. 2004). 
IDENTIFICATION OF COLLATERAL. The plaintiff 
bought and sold cattle and contracted with the defendant to 
temporarily care for the cattle until the cattle were sold. 
Although the cattle sale checks were made payable to both 
parties, the plaintiff sought the entire proceeds of the sales of 
some cattle. The defendant claimed a security interest in the 
cattle which entitled it to the proceeds of the sales. The plaintiff 
argued that the security interest was unperfected because the 
security agreement failed to identify the lots in which the cattle 
were kept at the defendant’s facility. The security agreement 
did identify the general business location but not the specific 
lots or pens used for the plaintiff’s cattle. The court noted that 
the security agreement also generally described the collateral 
as the plaintiff’s “interest in farm products, limited to livestock, 
whether now owned or hereafter created, acquired or arising; 
all of Feeder’s feed, vitamins, minerals, and medicine; all of 
Feeder’s contracts for the future purchase or future sale or 
delivery of the livestock; all of Feeder’s contract rights and 
accounts receivable, checks, drafts, notes, general intangibles 
and all the sale of any of the foregoing Collateral; all right, 
title, and the interest of Feeder as partner, joint venturer, co­
owner or otherwise with respect to any properties of the 
foregoing description; all of the foregoing, whether now 
owned or hereafter acquired; and all such Collateral being 
located on the real property described in Exhibit “A” and 
including without limitation all additions, accessions, 
substitutions and replacements of, for, or to all or any of the 
foregoing together with all proceeds and products of all or 
any of the foregoing, such livestock being specifically located 
in Lot(s) # ___ at Castro County Feeders, I, Ltd., Hart, Castro 
County, Texas. It is expressly agreed that the Collateral is 
perishable in nature and is of a type requiring immediate sale 
to recognize the full value.” The court held that the description 
of the collateral in its entirety was sufficient to identify the 
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plaintiff’s property covered by the security interest. Baldwin 
v. Castro County Feeders I, Ltd., 678 N.W.2d 796 (S.D. 
2004). 
PRIORITY. The debtor operated a livestock auction and 
also contracted for the feeding and care of cattle. The debtor’s 
operation was originally financed through a single creditor 
but the debtor obtained financing through a second creditor 
and the first creditor agreed to subordinate its liens to the 
second creditor’s liens. The second creditor inspected the 
debtor’s herds and was falsely told that all of the cattle on 
hand belonged to the debtor, although most of the cattle on 
hand belonged to a third party which had placed the cattle 
with the debtor for care and feeding. The third party had not 
filed any financing statement or obtained a security interest 
in the cattle. The debtor’s businesses failed and the second 
creditor and third party each claimed that the remaining cattle 
belonged to them. The third party argued that the care and 
feeding contract established a bailment which did not give the 
debtor any rights in the cattle sufficient for the second creditor’s 
security to attach. The trial court held that the third party was 
estopped from denying that the debtor had an attachable interest 
in the cattle because the third party did not file a financing 
statement and allowed the debtor to represent the cattle as 
belonging to the debtor. The appellate court agreed that there 
was sufficient evidence to support the estoppel holding and 
noted that the second creditor had made a reasonable attempt 
to discover the ownership of the cattle. American Bank & 
Trust v. Shaull, 678 N.W.2d 779 (S.D. 2004). 
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS

by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen 
August 24-27, 2004 Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE 
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and 
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors. 
The seminars are held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four 
days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On 
Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch 
business planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover agricultural commercial and property law with taxation. Your 
registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended and lunch. 
The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or 
Principles of Agricultural Law (and for each one of multiple registrations from one firm) are $185 (one day), $360 (two 
days), $525 (three days), and $670(four days). 
The registration fees for nonsubscribers are $200, $390, $570 and $720, respectively. 
All Digest subscribers will receive a brochure in the mail soon. Full information is also available online at http:// 
www.agrilawpress.com  Contact Robert Achenbach at 541-302-1958, e-mail Robert@agrilawpress.com 
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